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OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENTS IN THE 
GARRISON ENVIRONMENT
“Assessment is the determination of progress toward 
accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an 
objective.”
— Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Operations
Few words in the lexicon of any profession have undergone the explosion in usage that the word “assessments” has in the last fi ve years in the 
English-speaking profession of arms. The word now 
commonly triggers either a cringe or a debate, but rarely 
is there consensus on a common defi nition or viable 
methodology. 
Every command seems to re-interpret the doctrinal 
process of assessments. The widespread desire to do 
assessments “right” before consensus of what “right” 
looks like has spawned a cottage industry of scholars and 
consultants advising on and writing about the topic. Entry of 
assessments-related terms into your favorite search engine 
will result in hundreds of thousands to tens of millions of 
links, articles, and opinions. The opinions about the effi cacy 
of combat assessments do vary across theaters, operations, 
and units, but the sheer volume of work in the area of 
assessment — and the consumers of that work — indicates 
its importance in the deployment environment. 
Searching for concepts like “operational assessments in 
garrison,” “home-station operational assessments,” “home-
station assessments” in Google is fruitless. The search yields 
nothing, although a search for “assessments in garrison” 
did result in some thousands of hits — all of which seemed 
to include towns named Garrison. These results echo the 
anecdotal comments from offi cers assigned to assessments 
teams at the division level and higher regarding assessments 
within garrison. We simply don’t do formal operational 
assessments outside the combat environment.
In the combat environment, great time and organizational 
effort are invested in gaining consensus on and developing 
a viable assessment plan, collecting and analyzing data 
to support that plan, and communicating and defending 
the results of the assessment. Leaders “buy in” to the 
process because it provides information about how far the 
organization is from its goals and how fast the organization 
is moving toward those goals. This information is critical in 
weighing the risk associated with decisions that have life-
and-death consequences. 
Commanders at all ranks and levels of responsibility — 
from colonel (and even below) through several layers of 
general offi cer commanders to the strategic leaders of the 
United States and its coalition partners — rely on operational 
assessments to inform decisions on tactics, operations, 
strategy, and policy. To rely on assessments in combat 
and eschew them in garrison is to deny the commander an 
important, reliable tool.
This article builds upon the doctrine provided in JP 3-0 
and asserts that the craft of assessment supports two critical 
facets of organizational leadership: knowledge of location 
and velocity. It is through an active assessments process the 
leader gains insight into where the organization “is” relative 
to its goals and the rate at which the organization is moving 
toward (or away from) those goals. Understanding velocity 
(defi ned by magnitude and direction) relative to objectives 
provides information that enables the establishment of 
priorities, the communication of those priorities, and the 
resource allocation needed to achieve objectives associated 
with those priorities. This understanding is necessary for 
leadership of any sized organization in any environment — 
combat or garrison. 
This case study of how the 10th Mountain Division used 
a process of assessments to adopt a data-driven decision-
making culture has application to brigade and larger units 
in the military and a wide variety of civilian organizations. 
This manner of decision making was inculcated into the 
organization’s culture during its 2010-2011 deployment 
to Kandahar, Afghanistan, as the headquarters in charge 
of coalition operations in southern Afghanistan.1 As an 
indicator of the perceived value of this cultural shift, the 
assessment approach ensured the unit’s transition from a 
combat environment to its home station despite signifi cant 
transition of leadership. 
The Obstacles to Effective Garrison Operational 
Assessments
Across the Army, the most deployed division headquarters 
since 2001 have racked up deployments totaling nearly 
fi ve years. Five years of deployment means the division 
headquarters has been in garrison for about seven years 
(about 60 percent of the last 12 years). Operational 
assessments are an information stream commanders rely 
on in the crucible of combat and contingency operations. So, 
why are assessments abandoned when the unit returns to 
its home station? 
To gain some potential insight into the answer to this 
question, consider the differences between the deployed 
and garrison information environments (see Figure 1). 
In a combat or contingency environment, all forces are 
led by one commanding offi cer, resulting in a clear chain 
of command and little question of whose vision to follow. 
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Unity of command in the deployed environment results in 
unity of operational and staff efforts — including the area 
of operational assessments. Not only is the team formed 
with the sole purpose of accomplishing a mission, but the 
crucible of the mission pulls the organization closer together 
as an instrument to realize the commander’s vision. The 
sheer amount of will and effort expended to accomplish the 
deployed mission is staggering, with 100-hour work weeks 
the norm for many. Most importantly, the fact that decisions 
in the deployed environment make and take lives causes 
those hours to be worked at peak performance.
As Figure 1 asserts, the garrison environment is 
characterized differently than the deployed environment. 
The result is practices that work while deployed suffer at 
home station. By applying certain principles, an organization 
can benefi t from lessons learned while deployed to leverage 
a process that works in combat — operations assessment 
— in support of decisions made at home station.
Principles of Effective Assessments: Focus, 
Teamwork, Leadership, Diversity
Certain principles guide productive staff work in any 
discipline, any environment, and any organization. Though 
some are not typically associated with analytical work, 
assessment teams that have applied these principles have 
found success in making their analysis and assessment 
products relevant and appreciated by commanders and staff 
offi cers alike.
Focus on the result — support to command decision 
making. 
“For conventional confl icts, well-developed theories of 
war give a good understanding of the objectives to pursue 
and how to pursue them  In unconventional confl icts, the 
theories of war are more complex, objectives and ways 
to achieve them are less straightforward, and notions of 
‘winning’ and ‘losing’ are more diffi cult to defi ne.”2
The above statement highlights the challenge of focus in 
garrison assessments. In a conventional, symmetric, force-
on-force fi ght, success may be measured by the progress of 
the forward line of troops (FLOT) or the combat power of the 
enemy destroyed in an attack — both pieces of information 
that are readily attainable with today’s technology. As confl ict 
becomes less conventional or less symmetric, the theory of 
what it takes to “win” and the way 
we measure progress becomes 
less clear. Assessing progress 
in home station is more complex 
yet — there are not even any 
belligerents! How do we tell if we 
are “winning?”
The idea of “winning” can be 
abstracted from combat to apply 
in a useful sense to the garrison 
environment. We win in combat 
if we accomplish our objectives 
in accordance with a given timeline. We can defi ne a “win” in 
garrison the same way. Though the objectives will differ from 
combat, in garrison a commander still desires to achieve 
certain objectives before some pre-determined condition 
manifests. The decisions surrounding achievement of 
established objectives provide the assessments team with 
the focus it needs to provide timely command support. 
Specifi cally, it is through answering the following questions 
that the assessments team determines what data and 
information to collect, the appropriate style of analysis, and 
how to display the results so those results are clear to and 
impactful on the audience:
• Which decisions need to be made?
• When is the earliest time each decision can be made?
• When is the latest time each decision can be made?
• What is the risk of not making the decision on time?
• What is the expected effect of the decision?
The Mountain Readiness Conference (A 
Vignette About Focus)
The 10th Mountain Division and Fort Drum used a monthly 
event known as the Mountain Readiness Conference 
(MRC), run by the division’s operations offi cer and facilitated 
by the assessments team, to gauge if it was going in the 
right (the commanding general’s) direction. The MRC is a 
venue for senior command-level discussion including all 
lieutenant colonel and above commanders in the unit and on 
the installation (commanders from the 4th Brigade Combat 
Team attend virtually from Fort Polk, La., for topics that are 
not specifi c to Fort Drum). 
Due to the size of the organization and the amount of 
data available, it was not possible to discuss all the possible 
analysis considered interesting by all parties. Command 
priorities and objectives, coupled with the fi ve decision 
support questions previously stated, provided a focus for the 
analysis to be presented at the MRC. Only the highest priority 
topics impacting decisions that needed to be made “soon” 
and affected a large part of the organization were discussed 
in the conference. Items identifi ed as having secondary 
importance were analyzed, and insights generated were 
promulgated to each unit and staff section.
Assessment is a team sport. 
The late Ray Kroc (former CEO of McDonald’s) made 
Factor Deployment Environment Garrison Environment
Unity of command One commander-one mission Several commands/missions
Unity of effort Common purpose unites staff Multiple staffs lack synchronicity
Cohesion Team is formed to deploy Team is disbanded after deployment
Emphasis on team building 24/7 Personal life vs professional life
Amount of effort 100+ hour work week 40-50 hour work week
Sense of urgency Decisions make/take lives Bullets are not fl ying
Figure 1— Some Differences Between the Deployment and 
Garrison Information Environments
an observation about organizational 
effectiveness at McDonald’s — all of us 
is better than any of us — that applies 
to the assessment team. Staff cohesion 
makes or breaks the assessment 
process. In any environment, 
operational assessments are driven 
by data collected by people. The set 
of data is analyzed by professionals 
and synthesized into information. 
Refi ned information is discussed with 
subject matter experts, gleaning the 
“why” behind the “what” and turning 
information into knowledge that is 
shared with decision makers. 
Fort Drum’s Suicide 
Prevention Task Force (A 
Vignette About Teamwork)
The three commanding generals 
that led the 10th Mountain Division and Fort Drum from 
2009-2013 consistently focused on Soldier wellness as a 
primary area of command attention. Unfortunately, there is/
has been no set of quantitative measures identifi ed to date 
that successfully predict when a Soldier will commit some 
act of indiscipline (such as driving while drunk) or self-harm 
(such as a suicide event). However, the assessment team 
at Fort Drum developed qualitative fi ndings that could help 
small unit leaders keep their Soldiers safe from both acts of 
indiscipline and self-harm by leveraging the fact that “human 
relationships save human lives.”
Fort Drum’s Suicide Prevention Task Force (SPTF) had 
collected story boards over a six-month period in 2012 
that included the details of every suicide ideation, attempt, 
completed suicide, or other self-harm incident. As the SPTF 
was challenged to make sense of the data, the assessments 
team assisted. Three of the 14 factors identifi ed in the suicide 
prevention “Gold Book” manifested more often and were more 
causal than the other 11 factors. In a manner of speaking, 
these factors “bubbled to the top” of importance in this issue. 
The three factors (relationship problems, military work stress, 
and substance abuse) manifested at a rate about two-thirds 
higher than the next “layer” of risk factors. These three factors 
give leaders insight into how to diagnose their most at-risk 
Soldiers. 
No one agency could have collected the data, analyzed it, 
and reported it. It took the entire SPTF, as a team, to produce 
the insights that enabled leaders an important facet of taking 
care of the most at-risk Soldiers. Subsequently, it was the 
leadership teams that must pick up the information and use 
it, or the information is useless.
Leadership is paramount. 
For any team to maintain its focus and be successful, it 
must have strong leadership. The leader of a command’s 
assessment team must be a team builder who has the savvy 
to maintain the relationships that keep a diverse team together 
after it’s formed. This leader 
also needs to be an individual 
viewed as a “closer” within the 
organization, a person who 
can manage a complex task 
through its completion.
Who is this leader? The 
individual that should be in 
charge of the command’s 
assessments initiative has 
been a source of contention for 
some time. As discussed by Dr. 
Stephen Downes-Martin (Naval 
War College) and Dr. Jonathan 
Schroden (Center for Navy 
Analysis), this responsibility 
typically falls on the person 
with technical expertise in 
the area of analysis — those 
school-trained in operations 
research and systems analysis (the dreaded ORSA). If the 
command does not have an ORSA, it fi nds the person on the 
staff regarded as a “quant” or an analytical thinker. It needn’t 
be so.
Quantitative analysis is but one part (and not the most 
important part) of the assessments process. An observation 
that pains an analyst to make is that while “number crunching” 
is interesting to the folks doing it, it’s rarely interesting to 
anyone else. What is interesting to many is the discussion 
surrounding analytical outputs. It is what comes out of 
this discussion that is valuable to the commander (or any 
decision maker) — not necessarily what goes in to it. 
While the assessments leader does not have to be 
a numbers person, the ability to conduct high-quality 
quantitative analysis is required for a productive assessment 
process. Few mistakes damage the reputation of work that 
includes analysis more than bad science. Downes-Martin 
observed “the proliferation of ‘junk arithmetic’ and fl awed logic 
[damages] commanders’ credibility and decision support...”3
Consider that “high-quality” quantitative analysis is not the 
same as “complicated” analysis. Einstein is attributed with 
the thought that “everything should be made as simple as 
possible, but no simpler.” It is so with decision support. 
Find an analyst who understands the problems at hand, 
knows what the boss needs, and doesn’t add superfl uous 
complexity. 
The ability to conduct appropriate, scientifi cally correct 
analysis isn’t the only specifi c talent the assessment leader 
must recruit. The second is communication. Insightful analysis 
is only useful if it’s heard and understood by decision makers. 
There must be at least one person on the assessment team 
who can transform a wide variety of inputs into a useful 
message to the intended audience. This communicator must 
be able to capture the essence of discussions throughout 
the assessment process, combine this essence with outputs 
of the process, and relate potentially complex ideas in plain 
language to a diverse audience, both orally and in writing. 
Without such a communicator, the message of progress is 
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Quantitative analysis is but one part 
(and not the most important part) 
of the assessments process. An 
observation that pains an analyst 
to make is that while “number 
crunching” is interesting to the folks 
doing it, it’s rarely interesting to 
anyone else. What is interesting to 
many is the discussion surrounding 
analytical outputs. It is what comes 
out of this discussion that is valuable 
to the commander (or any decision 
maker) — not necessarily what goes 
in to it. 
potentially misunderstood, lost, or does not reach the entirety 
of the intended audience.
It takes an effective leader to be able to bring together the 
right personnel with the right experience and knowledge to 
have a productive dialogue. As mentioned, the team must 
have an analyst and communicator. The remaining members 
of the team must be selected to form a representation of 
the organization as a whole. Often, the right people have 
no direct linkage within the organization; they have to be 
“asked rather than tasked” to participate. Recruiting people 
to the assessments process and motivating them to stay is 
an exercise in (usually) peer leadership, generally thought to 
be the most diffi cult form of leadership. 
Diversity enables knowledge generation. 
The importance of diversity in thinking has already been 
suggested in this article. It is quite simply, the “wisdom 
of crowds,” to borrow a phrase made popular by James 
Surowiecki’s book of the same title.4 In the book, Surowiecki 
highlights characteristics of “wise” crowds and “failure” 
crowds, summarized in Figure 2. Consider these factors in 
choosing who to recruit into the assessments process.
In the military environment, it may be easier to identify 
experts that fi t the characteristics of the “wise” crowd than 
in other organizations, as military staffs are compartmented 
by skill set and experience. However, the importance of a 
dynamic leader shines through as someone who needs to 
bring a group of diverse group of independently thinking 
people together. The more diffi cult task is then to manage 
the time and discussion in an unconstrained, decentralized 
manner so opinions are aggregated and productive outputs 
are generated for decision makers.
The benefi ts of a diverse assessments team reach well 
beyond the primary effect, which is to generate the most 
useful, timely, refi ned knowledge to support decision making. 
The assessments process also serves as a staff-integrating 
and synchronizing function. The wider net cast to comprise 
the assessments group, the wider the direct message of 
analytical and assessment fi ndings and results are spread. 
The staff receives information going to the commander 
fi rsthand rather than through layers of fi lters that pervert 
the actual message. As actual results are promulgated, 
the primary staff offi cers and subordinate commanders see 
where the data they send goes and how it is used. The utility 
of the process becomes evident, the amount and fi delity of 
data and information received increases, and the process 
becomes more useful — a virtuous cycle.
The four principles of effective assessment (focus, 
teamwork, leadership, and diversity) may take different 
practical forms in garrison compared with the combat 
environment, but they are the foundation of a useful, 
productive assessment process. Strong leadership is 
paramount in not only assembling the assessments team, 
but getting the most out of this diverse talent pool. Having 
to ask for help and not being able to task for support can 
be more of a challenge but results in unity borne of choice 
rather than compliance resulting from orders. 
When strong leadership builds a diverse, cross-functional 
team, the resultant outputs are greater than what would 
be possible from each of the individuals. Ideas bounce off 
each other, merge, grow, and mature, providing synthesized 
knowledge and insight that is “graduate-level” support to 
command decision making. When this intellectual capacity 
is focused on those decisions the commander deems critical 
to move his organization forward toward its goals (on time), 
the entire organization benefi ts.
Conclusion
Assessments are deemed critical in the combat 
environment, yet seem to be largely forgotten about in the 
garrison environment. There are many forces at work causing 
this to be so — from the emotional letdown upon returning from 
a life-and-death environment, to units being ripped apart and 
re-assembled, to the presence of multiple commanders and 
confl icting priorities. Even so, the fact remains that even the 
most-deployed units have spent more than 60 percent of the 
last 12 years in garrison. A process so relied upon in combat 
cannot be disregarded in the very environment we spend 
the most time. Use the 10th Mountain Division’s assessment 
principles (strong leadership, assessment team diversity, 
and focus on command priorities) and realize the benefi ts of 
analytical support to decision making — even at home.
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Figure 2 — Characteristics of “Wise” and 
“Failure” Crowds
